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Abstract 
Cost in health economics is necessarily associated with a decision. It varies according to the context 
of that decision: whether about inputs or outputs, the alternatives, its timing, the nature of the 
commitment to following a decision, who the decision maker is, and the constraints and discretion 
limiting or liberating the decision maker. Distinctions between short/long runs and between 
fixed/variable inputs are matters of choice, not technology, and are similarly context-dependent. 
Costs are not harms or negative consequences. Whether  ‘ĐůŝŶŝĐĂůůǇƵŶƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ? future costs and 
benefits should be counted in current decisions also depends on context. The costs of entire health 
programmes are context-dependent, relating to planned rates of activity, volumes and timings. The 
implications for the methods of CEA and HTA are different in the contexts of low- and middle- 
income countries compared with high-income countries, and further differ contextually according to 
budget constraints (fixed or variable). 
 
Key words 
Opportunity cost, choice, decisions, context, short/long runs, fixed/variable costs, unrelated costs, 
LMICs.  
 
Highlights 
Opportunity cost is harder to pin down than is commonly thought. 
Some costs are inherently subjective. 
Cost is not the same as harm or negative consequences. 
Cost is always context-dependent.  
Distinctions between short and long runs and between fixed and variable costs are chosen, not given 
technologically. 
 ‘Unrelated costs ? should not always be included in cost-effectiveness analyses. 
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Cost, context and decisions in Health Economics and cost-effectiveness analysis 
 ?KďƐĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĞƌƌŽƌƐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶĐŽƐƚĂŶĚƐƵƉƉůǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ?ŽƌďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ ?ƚŚĞ
ŝŵŵĞŶƐĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ? ?lchian 1977, 273). What Alchian could write in 1959 is apposite 
for ƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĂŶĚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ in the economic evaluation of health care technologies. 
The idea of opportunity cost is ill-understood (or, better, differently understood) not only by people 
who are not economists, but even by economists including, we may presume, health economists. 
 
In 2005, Ferraro and Taylor (2005) put a question based on one by Frank and Bernanke (2001), to 
199 economists. I have adapted it for health economists1. 
 
You have a health condition that could be treated without charge by your public national health 
insurance programme. You could also  ?go private ? by registering with a local surgical clinic offering 
medical care of an equivalent quality for which you would pay out of pocket, which is your next-best 
alternative choice. The price of private treatment is $400 and the maximum you would be willing to 
pay for private care is $500. Assume there are no other costs of either option. Based on this 
information, what is the opportunity cost of choosing public health care: 
 
A. $0 
B. $100 
C. $400 
D. $500? 
 
The most popular answer was $500, with 27.6% of respondents choosing this answer. The second 
most popular answer was $400, with 25.6% of respondents choosing it. The third was $0, with 25.1% 
of respondents choosing it. $100 was the least popular, with only 21.6% of respondents choosing it. 
The answers from these well-trained economists seemed to be randomly distributed across the four 
possible answers. What is your answer? What is the correct answer? 
 
According to Ferraro and Taylor, $100 was the right answer: the value to you of the forgone care 
($500) less the $400 out-of-pocket price you also forgo. In this case, it is essentially the consumer ?Ɛ 
surplus forgone. But you could have taken a different view: you could have valued the forgone 
opportunity at its market price ($400) which one may suppose represents the minimum sum the 
providers must receive for their services. Or you might have taken the view that the opportunity cost 
is best considered descriptively: what was forgone was private care with a bundle of associated 
characteristics which you say you value at $500. Or you might say the opportunity cost was $0, since 
whatever you decide, the service will be provided to someone with no additional resource costs than 
if it were provided to you.  
 
This kind of confusion is plainly a serious matter, since opportunity cost is one of the half dozen key 
economic concepts whose understanding defines a professional health economist. One reason for 
confusion in this case may have been the unfamiliar context: the test was not couched in terms of 
the opportunity cost of resources used in the production of a good or service but rather in the 
                                                          
1 The test question in the original was: Please Circle the Best Answer to the Following Question: 
You won a free ticket to see an Eric Clapton concert (which has no resale value). Bob Dylan is performing on the same night 
and is your next-best alternative activity. Tickets to see Dylan cost $40. On any given day, you would be willing to pay up to 
$50 to see Dylan. Assume there are no other costs of seeing either performer. Based on this information, what is the 
opportunity cost of seeing Eric Clapton? 
A. $0 
B. $10 
C. $40 
D. $50 
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context of choice between a final good or service (see Parkin 2016 for other explanations). The $100 
opportunity cost is subjective and is revealed neither by the prices of the options nor in any system 
of accounting. The other two interpretations (C and D) follow straightforwardly: the market price of 
the private care ($400) on the one hand and the general characteristics of the forgone option (choice 
of physician, early admission, etc.) valued at $500 on the other.  
 
&ƌŽŵĂƉƵďůŝĐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁƚŚĞŵŽƐƚuseful approach may be any one of the 
following: 
 
(1) In order to understand patient behaviour and the (dis)incentives required to change it; 
(2) To appreciate what must be forgone in the health care system for an expenditure of 
$400 per patient on a public service contracted to a private service supplier; 
(3) To discover whether a publicly provided service package might be provided at a lower 
cost than a contracted-out service having somewhat different characteristics; 
(4) To dismiss the whole issue as a question of transfers rather than costs. 
 
All four answers may therefore have something to be said for them as a reasonable interpretation 
according to context. What is reasonable seems to depend on context: what is the question, who is 
the decision maker and what is the decision maker seeking to achieve? It should not be surprising 
that opportunity cost will vary according to identity (e.g. position in a hierarchy of decision makers) 
and the objectives of the decision maker (utility maximising, profit maximising, health maximising?). 
 
This paper is an attempt to demystify and clarify the idea of cost in economics, not only for health 
economists but also for analysts from other disciplines and for members of multidisciplinary teams 
working on economic evaluations in the field of health, health care and social care. This basic idea, 
that costs (and, for that matter, benefits) cannot be defined without specifying the context of the 
decision, turns out to be a recurring theme. I shall assume, to avoid residual ambiguity, that the cost 
with which we are concerned in decisions about health care investments (using, for example, HTA) 
are the costs of resources and that the opportunities forgone are those arising from the varied uses 
to which those resources might be put. 
 
Opportunity cost and the production of services 
Early emphasis on the importance of opportunity cost in economics is particularly associated with 
the Austrian School of economics in the late nineteenth century: 
 
To say that any kind of production involves cost simply implies that the economic means of 
production, which could doubtless have been usefully employed in other directions, are either used 
up in it, or are suspended in it. (von Wieser 1893, 175) 
 
This is ǁŚĂƚZŽďďŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐtŝĞƐĞƌ ?Ɛ>Ăǁ ? ‘ ‘ŽƐƚ ?in economics is a term commonly 
applied to resources ?ŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ ‘ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? that have alternative uses rather than 
resources interpreted as items of final consumption (arguments of utility functions). ? The term 
 ‘opportunity cost ? may refer to the value of the most preferred alternative use to the current or to a 
planned use; or it may refer to the quantities of a good or service that is forgone, like an alternative 
drug, or an alternative nurse; or it may refer to states of being  W most notably for health economists, 
health itself, so that the opportunity cost of a decision becomes the health that would have been 
generated had the decision gone in favour of the preferred alternative. Whichever of these it may 
be, cost is always an opportunity that is necessarily forsaken when a decision is made. In a well-
informed market with low transaction costs, the value of the forgone opportunity (say, use of a 
resource) may be objectively revealed as a dollar amount. This represents the highest value 
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someone else places upon it as revealed in offers they make, and where they will need to be outbid 
if several are bidding, or compensated if they already own it and are to make it available to a bidder 
in a Walrasian auction. Within an organisation like a hospital or an ambulance service, resources also 
have alternative uses, some of which are within the organisation (for example, rooms can be 
reallocated to other uses) and some of which lie outside (for example, ambulances can be sold to 
other users). The external uses may reveal opportunity cost as a monetary price. The internal 
opportunity cost is not revealed in a market price but is subjective, existing only in the mind of the 
decision maker (Buchanan 1969, Wiseman 1989). This is not to say that the subjective judgment that 
a particular resource is best used in a particular way is not a communicable judgment. Plainly that is 
not the case, as managers, who often have to act upon their subjective valuations of opportunity 
cost, can be held to account for their decisions through audit trails, direct enquiries and so on and 
can give their reasons for making the decisions they made when called to account.  
 
Cost is always the consequence of a decision and is in turn a consequence of the resource scarcity 
that standard texts tell us (at least since Robbins 1932) lies at the heart of economics as an analytical 
discipline. All economists seem to agree that the forgoing of a want or need is fundamental and not 
itself contextual. It is what defines cost. All else, however, is contextual. How the forgone option is 
best measured or valued will therefore depend on who the decision maker is and the question the 
decision maker wants answered.  
 
Costs vs undesired attributes 
A significant implication of the idea of opportunity cost is that negative consequences are not the 
same as costs. There is a tendency, especially in applying techniques like multi-criteria decision-
analysis (MCDA), to create categories (often overlapping) of benefits and costs treated broadly as 
 ‘pros ? and  ‘cons ? (Campillo-Artero et al. 2018). >ŽŽƐĞƵƐĂŐĞĞĂƐŝůǇƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵƐ ‘harm ? or  ‘negative 
consequence ? into  ‘cost ?. Consider the homely example given by Alchian, whose extensive reworking 
of the cost theories of the Austrian School (notably von Wieser 1893) and the early English 
marginalists (Wicksteed 1910, Jevons 1871, Marshall 1871) is drawn on extensively here.  
 
Suppose you want to build a pool in your garden.  ?The toil and trouble of digging it and the nuisance 
of noisy disobedient neighbourhood children and uninvited guests who use it are undesirable 
attributes of the pool. They are not the costs of creating and having the pool. This distinction 
between (a) undesirable attributes inherent in some event and (b) the highest-value forsaken option 
necessary to realize the event is fundamental, for only the latter is cost as the term is used in 
ecoŶŽŵŝĐƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?-2). Blood, sweat and tears associated with building the pool are not costs. They 
may be relevant to the decision in two ways: they reduce the value of creating and having the pool 
and they may be, indeed probably are, attributes of some of the other human inputs in the pool-
building project which may need compensation if these resources are to be made available and 
thereby enter into costs. But they are not costs of building the pool because they are not resources 
having alternative uses. If, however, you are doing the digging, then of course your time is a 
resource with alternative uses and is accordingly a cost. 
 
Cost and decisions 
Cost is an opportunity for using a resource that is necessarily forsaken when a decision is made. The 
character of the decision in question will normally affect its cost. This implies (as we have already 
seen) that what is considered to be a cost is context-dependent.  
 
As has again been seen, some costs are subjective, not readily revealed in systems of accounts, and 
only indirectly revealed by decisions. One aspect of context relates to the decision and the nature of 
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the commitment being entered into. One may distinguish, for example, between a decision to 
acquire (acquisition cost) and a decision to operate a programme of costs and outcomes over a 
period of time. Of course, one may combine them if the decision is both to acquire a resource and to 
use it in particular ways for a period. But one may also consider these as two (successive) decisions. 
Since the period over which the production programme is to be run is also a matter of choice, there 
is an opportunity cost of each. The cost of acquisition is a decision to buy. Since it may not be a 
decision to also hold the acquired asset, the actual cost of buying is simply the immediate 
depreciation in value when the resource changes ownership: the difference between the purchase 
price and its immediate resale value. The decision to operate a programme also entails expenditures 
(usually called variable costs) that are incurred over time and whose present (discounted) value is 
the cost of running the programme at the time of decision. The variable costs in health care, as 
elsewhere, are typically a function of the rate of activity, the planned volume of work, the date at 
which it is to begin, and the length of the period over which it is to run.  
 
A typical health care programme might embody both the acquisition and the continuing use of a 
resource, usually combined with others, over a planned period, with planned or anticipated rates of 
utilisation by a target population. These are all matters for the decision maker to decide and 
different decisions (according to context) generate different costs and benefits. In HTA or CEA it is 
usual to consider first the inherent potential of the resource viewed as an  ‘intervention ? or 
 ‘technology ?. One category of consideration is the expected direct health benefit per individual and 
any associated positive or negative health-related consequences as viewed by the decision maker. 
These would typically be discounted over the lifetime of the individual beneficiaries. The opportunity 
costs would be discounted over the period in which costs are incurred (the maximum being the 
remaining lifetime of each beneficiary). A second category to consider is the intended population 
who will receive the intervention. The present value of the programme costs of the decision to 
provide a technology of a specified type for a specific population under specific circumstances for a 
specified period would then constitute the general opportunity cost of the decision to run the 
programme. That is, the opportunity cost of the resources in their most preferred alternative use  W 
wherever that might be.  
 
The present value of a cost or benefit accruing in the distant future is quite small. For example, at 
3%, ĂĚŽůůĂƌŝŶ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?ƚŝŵĞhas a present value of just above 2 cents and over 30 years of about 
ĨŽƵƌĐĞŶƚƐ ?ƚ ?A?ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚǀĂůƵĞƐĂƌĞŽŶĞĐĞŶƚŝŶ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?ƚŝŵĞĂŶĚŽŶĞfifth of a cent after 50 
years. The importance of accuracy in distant costs and benefits is evidently less than that of closer 
costs and benefits.  
 
Even a high-level health care decision maker is typically required to operate within a budget. This is 
as true of a private sector insurer as it is of a public sector insurer. How they optimise their decisions 
is likely, however, to depend on different criteria. A public sector payer might typically specify one 
criterion (among others) such as maximising the impact of the available budget on population 
health. In such a case, the opportunity cost of investing in one programme rather than another may 
be most usefully considered in terms of the forgone population health that the most preferred 
alternative use would have been expected to have generated. This is not subjective and can be 
empirically estimated (as by Claxton et al. 2012). 
 
The determination of the budget is a matter for decision makers higher in the hierarchy of decision; 
for example, the senior management team and board of a commercial insurer, the senior 
management and trustees of a non-profit payer or a cabinet of ministers in a government. In each 
case, the decision maker is appointed by and is accountable to a still higher authority, which is the 
ultimate source for the values of the organisation as stated in, for example, its vision, aims and 
objectives, and in any specific obligations, some of which may be legal requirements, placed upon 
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the decision maker. The governance arrangements and lines of authority and accountability of a 
decision-making organisation constrain decision makers and, by the same token, constrain the role 
of economic advisers, whose accountability is typically to the decision maker. Analysts are, of course, 
at liberty to state their own values and erect economic evaluations accordingly, without any 
accountability other than to their own consciences, but such studies would be a species of advocacy 
unless there were a coincidental symmetry between these values and those of decision makers in 
the relevant sector. 
 
Scope of decisions 
The programme scope (whom covered, for what conditions and over what period) is a matter of 
choice for the decision maker. The scope of a decision defines the perspective of an economic 
evaluation and therefore the alternative uses of resources to be considered. The scope essentially 
specifies the matters of interest to the decision maker and generally includes such considerations as 
the following: the technology or technologies to be evaluated and their comparators; the character 
of benefits to be assessed; the expenditures (budget impact) and costs to be considered; the types 
of individual whose interests as patients, family carers, clinical professionals, service providers, 
product manufacturers and so on, are to be embraced; the measures of benefit; the periods over 
which costs and benefits are to be measured, and any harms or non-health benefits that may accrue. 
These  W by no means a complete list - all have the characteristic that they require social value 
judgements to be made about their inclusion or exclusion and the weight to be attached to some of 
them when they are combined. In addition, there are technical specifications which do not embody 
social value judgements as distinct from judgements, some of which may be value judgments, 
concerning scientific method. These judgments about  ‘good science ? are sometimes embodied in a 
reference case (e.g. Wilkinson et al. 2016) requiring social virtues like explicitness about the value 
judgements used, transparent evidence and modelling that enables replication by other scholars, 
and other scientific values like appraising the quality of evidence (robustness, precision, etc.) and the 
use of efficient sensitivity analysis. 
 
While defining scope and making social value judgments are the responsibility of decision makers, it 
does not follow that analysts have no role to play. On the contrary, they are by experience better at 
distinguishing between social value judgments, other kinds of value judgment (e.g. as to what is 
 ‘good ? science), and other kinds of judgment, both qualitative and quantitative. They can brief 
decision makers on the ethical implications of possible decisions, and they can seek logical 
consistency. Decision makers are apt to make some decisions for illegitimate reasons, or without 
weighing the alternatives. For example, in deciding the scope of a specific HTA a decision maker 
might implicitly exclude some consequences through oversight, for political convenience, to avoid 
inconvenient conflicts, or through inability to imagine some of the collateral possibilities. The analyst 
should be able to alert decision makers to such possibilities so that the decision, when taken, can be 
ƐĞĞŶƚŽďĞĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ?dŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐƚƚŽƵƐƵƌƉƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƌ ?Ɛ
accountable role, but rather to support it in principled ways. 
 
Scope is also contextual. Consider the perspective adopted in a low- or middle- income country by 
an internal decision maker in the Ministry of Health compared to that adopted by an external aid 
giver. At the aggregate level concerning the size, target population and periodicity of the aid, the 
opportunity cost as seen by the aid giver might be seen exclusively in terms of alternative countries, 
populations and dates while that seen by the internal decision maker will characteristically concern 
the consequences of substitution effects. An example of substitution would be if domestic funding is 
replaced in part or whole by aid funding and domestic resources are released for other uses 
(including non-health uses like better roads and more secondary education). Internally, the 
opportunity cost of declining the aid includes the loss of a variety of health and non-health benefits 
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of which only some may be of concern to the aid giver. The opportunity cost for each party is 
defined by its own objective function and budget constraint. 
 
Related and unrelated costs 
Morton et al. (2016) briefly reviewed a long-standing controversy over the treatment of  ‘unrelated ? 
costs (and benefits), defined as consequences of a decision that prolongs life and hence may involve 
future costs (and benefits) that would not otherwise have been incurred. They make a strong 
argument for a balanced approach, that is, either include unrelated costs and benefits or exclude 
both. They argue, following several other contributions that the correct approach is to include both 
(suitably adjusted, of course, for timing and uncertainty). Is this correct? 
 
The first notable problem with the recommendation of Morton et al. is that it is vulnerable to an ad 
nauseam problem of infinite regress. It is one thing to consider the costs of future expected 
treatments that result from extensions to life but another to take account of the further life 
extensions that these future interventions may make possible, the new children who may be born 
who would not otherwise have been born, and who will doubtless have future heath care needs. 
Indeed, if all unrelated costs are, as a matter of principle, to be considered, no matter how remote in 
time or geography, then there appears to be no limit to the costs to be considered other than those 
imposed by discounting and time preference on the one hand and the sheer cost of making the 
necessary estimates on the other. There is, however, a deeper problem with including unrelated 
costs (and benefits). This arises from their interpretation of official guidance on the conduct of 
economic appraisal in the public sector (HM Treasury 2003) as folůŽǁƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƚĞƐƚĨŽƌŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŽƌ
excluding a cost or benefit depends on whether it flows from the commitment which we are being 
asked to make ĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? ?Indeed that is so. However, we need to be satisfied that 
a consequence does indeed flow from the decision and to enquire as to the nature of that 
 ‘commitment ?. 
 
The idea of  ‘commitment ? implies some form of contract, for example one having the nature that an 
extended survival consequent to the current decision will entitle an individual to such further 
(clinically unrelated) interventions as may be deemed needed (or demanded). Such contracts cannot 
be taken for granted. In a health care system having a defined benefits package, future unrelated 
costs of interventions not in the package at thĞĨƵƚƵƌĞĚĂƚĞǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞŝŶĐƵƌƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?Ɛ
current decision maker and the present value of any expected expenditures made by others are not 
costs of the current decision. By contrast, in an established system that is comprehensive in its 
coverage of people and treatments, the reasonable expectation is that there is a commitment to 
meet future consequential but unrelated costs, including those to be incurred by the as yet unborn 
descendants of the present generation of beneficiaries. 
 
It thus becomes clear that the treatment of unrelated costs is context-dependent. In Low- and 
Middle- Income Countries (LMICs) only now venturing into long term strategy for universal health 
coverage, if the reasonable expectation is that future unrelated care needs will not be covered in the 
benefits package, then they should not be included as costs of current decisions, unlike the future 
costs of treating clinically related conditions (unless these are exempted by the decision maker as an 
explicit social value judgment). In countries where the expectation is that unrelated treatments will 
be delivered, or in any scheme in which future unrelated consequential care is provided for, then 
unrelated costs ought to be included in the costs of the current decision. In private health insurance 
schemes, whether or not unrelated future costs are properly included depends again on the 
contract. 
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Benefits and costs should in general be treated symmetrically. If, for example, future unrelated costs 
are not covered by the contract, then estimates of future benefits that implicitly include the benefits 
of future unrelated interventions should be adjusted downwards and, in the reverse case when 
unrelated treatments are included, estimates of the present value of subsequent benefits ought also 
to be included. 
 
Some past advocates of inclusion (e.g. Morton et al. 2016) take NICE to task when it prescribes in its 
NICE Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisal (NICE, 2013)  ?costs that are considered to be 
unrelated to the condition or technology ŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚ ? ?On the contrary, the kind 
of implicit contract represented by the NHS describes precisely the circumstances under which such 
costs ought to be taken into account. Use of life tables to estimate benefits from NICE-approved 
interventions almost certainly include the benefits of future unrelated interventions, which suggests 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚE/ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŝƐŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚŝŶŝƚƐasymmetrical treatment of costs and benefits. 
 
Rates and volumes 
There is an ambiguity in the idea of an outcome or output in health care, as elsewhere, which can 
mislead. The ambiguity is this: are we speaking of rates or volume of output? The relation between 
cost and rates or volumes in economics is in general qualitative, in the sense that the relationship 
can be signed as positive or negative. Whether the effect size is substantial or not is entirely an 
empirical matter. The following empirical generalisations may probably be deployed by health 
economists to good effect: 
 
Postponed implementation of a decision has a lower cost than immediate implementation. Reasons 
for this include improved information enhancing the effective use of medicines and other inputs and 
the possibility of lower future prices through negotiation. When a decision maker wishes to 
implement a decision ǀĞƌǇƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ?ŽŶĞŵŝŐŚƚƐĂǇ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƌƚƌƵŶ ? ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚǀĂůƵĞŽĨĐŽƐƚǁŝůůďĞ
higher than otherwise. A classic example is the response to an epidemic. The case for advance stock-
piling of medicines and fast-response teams of specialists is that they are relatively low-cost means 
of achieving the benefits of an emergency intervention. At the time of actually using these 
resources, however, the alternatives forgone at the time of their creation are sunk costs and quite 
irrelevant to the current choice situation, when the opportunity costs relate to the alternative uses 
of the stocks and teams rather than to their creation. 
 
Sunk costs should generally be ignored in decision-making, other than as learning experiences that 
may inform future decisions. The fact that resources were forgone in a decision that is already made 
is not a determinant of the current alternative use value of resources. Thus, the fact that large sums 
may have already been expended on a health project is not an argument for completing the project 
if the current assessment of the opportunity cost of completing it exceeds the present value of the 
benefits of completion. It may be that heavy past expenditures are deployed in a face-saving 
exercise, but that represents an investment in something other than health or health care. 
 
ŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ?ƐŚŽƌƚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ůŽŶŐ ?ƌƵŶƐĂƌĞcontext-dependent and not for arbitrary 
measurement. A short run is one in which the decision maker chooses not to vary one or more 
ŝŶƉƵƚƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ĨŝǆĞĚ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚŝŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞďĞǀĂƌŝĞĚ ?dŚĞůŽŶŐƌƵŶŝƐ
when all, or at any rate a significant number of inputs, are chosen to be varied. Neither, despite their 
names, has anything to do with periods of time. Both are determined by an interaction between the 
desires of the decision maker and the costs of changing specific inputs, some of which may be 
changed quickly with relatively low adjustment costs, but others not. In short, the decision maker 
ĐŚŽŽƐĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌƵŶ ?; it is not a technically fixed or exogenous variable. 
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Whether a cost is treated as fixed or variable is context-dependent. Thus, a contracted rental lease 
on a building or a contract of employment may be taken as  ‘given ? in many contexts involving the 
use of the resources under contract. Contracts can, however, always be renegotiated (at a cost) or 
breached (at a cost) and so become variable when decision makers judge the circumstances to 
require adjusting a fixity. 
 
Resources that are apparently technically fixed are also variable in some context. Buildings and 
railway track are examples of resources that seem fixed for most purposes. However, both are 
subject to more or less constant maintenance and minor alteration so that, over time, substantial 
increases or reductions in infrastructure are achieved. They can even be varied very quickly when it 
is so wished. tŚĞŶƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚ'ƌĞĂƚtĞƐƚĞƌŶZĂŝůǁĂǇ ?ƐŽůĚďƌŽĂĚ-gauge track was changed to the 
modern standard narrow gauge in 1892, the entire stretch of 213 miles from Exeter to Penzance was 
changed in one weekend (Smith 1985). Thus, for some decisions (e.g. usual timetabling and 
ticketing) the track is assumed fixed and for others it is assumed variable. 
Resources vary in the costliness of their variability. In the 1892 conversion of English railway track, 
177 miles of the stretch of line between Exeter and Penzance had to be altered from the old 
longitudinal timbers to the modern cross-sleepers (ties) all in one weekend. It took an army of 
platelayers to do it  W 4200 of them. The only truly fixed factor is either one for which the cost of 
varying really are infinite or one that the decision maker wants to vary literally immediately.  
 
Time. It is useful when planning the production and delivery of health services to consider the 
impact on the present value of costs of: 
 
x The starting date (postponement as already mentioned). 
x The closing date (up to a possible date at which discounting renders the present value 
negligible). 
x The rate of output (i.e. the output or outcomes expected per period). 
x The volume of output (i.e. the cumulative output or outcomes between the starting and 
closing dates). 
x The faster the rate of an activity, in general the higher the present value of its cost for 
any planned programme period. This is a standard expectation of cost functions, 
implying that marginal cost is positive. It may not hold universally, however. Stocks of 
medicines, for example, may not increase in proportion to the rate of ĂĐůŝŶŝĐ ?s activity. 
Again, context matters and conventional assumptions always need checking. 
x dŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĞǀŽůƵŵĞŽĨĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚǀĂůƵĞŽĨĂƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ƐĐŽƐƚ ?
The volume of a service is the cumulative output over a defined period, i.e. a planned 
programme. Plainly, given both the date at which a programme begins and a constant 
rate of activity, enlarging its volume implies a more distant endpoint. Alternatively, with 
a given (chosen) endpoint, volume may increase only if the rate of activity also rises.  
x The greater the volume of activity given a constant rate of output, the lower the 
marginal cost (i.e. the present value of cost rises but at a decreasing rate). The reason 
for this volume effect is usually that planning for larger volumes enables the use of 
more cost-effective methods. For example, at low volumes patients may be referred 
elsewhere for some diagnostic tests, whereas a larger volume makes desirable the 
ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĂŶĚƵƐĞŽĨĂƐĐĂŶŶĞƌŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶ ?dŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐĂ ‘ƐĐĂůĞ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ? 
x The larger the volume, the lower the present value of cost of each unit of 
output/outcome (average cost). 
x If both the rate and the volume of activity increase, the impact on marginal cost is 
ambiguous and is entirely context-dependent, i.e. requiring specific evidence from 
trials, pilots and the like. 
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Social cost, externalities and publicness 
ŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĐŽƐƚŝƐĂĐŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƐĞĚŽŶŽƚŚĞƌƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƌ ?ƐǁŝƚŚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ?ĐŽƐƚƐ ?ŽŶĞ
should distinguish between opportunity costs and harms. An external harm occurs when an 
infectious person communicates a disease to others having a direct negative impact on their welfare. 
There may also be external opportunity costs, for example in the form of defensive health care to 
mitigate the transmitted disease or reduction in productivity through absenteeism and 
presenteeism. External costs (of interest to health economists) include the consequences of hazards 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ŝŶƚƌĂĨĨŝĐ ?ĂŶĚƉŽůůƵƚŝŽŶďǇŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂŶd private 
households. Social costs are the sum of internal (private) and external costs. It is unhelpful to treat, 
external costs as equivalent to social costs (as is sometimes found). External costs, when they exist, 
along with internal costs, are an element of social cost. When they are absent, social cost is the same 
as internal cost. 
 
External costs generally arise in the absence of appropriate property rights, specifically in the ability 
of people to be able to establish titles, for example, to a bug- and pollution-free environment  W or its 
converse. With tradeable rights, either the imposer of the cost must compensate those on whom 
the costs are thrust or, in the converse case, the polluter must be compensated for reductions in 
pollution (Coase 1960). Since many of these external effects have the character of publicness, there 
will often be a need for public regulation of tax/subsidy arrangements that, for example, subsidise 
vaccination programmes and establish markets in pollution rights.  
 
The optimal level of pollution, like the optimal incidence or prevalence of a common disease, is 
unlikely to be zero. There are two main reasons for this. One is that the marginal benefit falls as the 
external cost or harm is increasingly controlled, while the marginal cost of controlling it commonly 
rises. The optimal level will therefore typically be higher than zero because the social value of 
further elimination is less than its social cost. In public health care systems with a fixed budget, 
exceeding this optimal level implies that more health is being sacrificed than further elimination will 
generate. The other reason is that there are many other opportunities for public expenditure on 
health, and a policy of pollution elimination to benefit health is unlikely to commend itself if that 
expenditure might generate a greater health benefit by being applied to other health care activity. 
This is an example of the opportunity cost where spending health care resources on one programme 
is the health lost from not spending it on another. 
 
The economic  ‘publicness ? of the effects of these decisions has little to do with the ownership of 
resources, which may be either public or private. The critical characteristic of a public good or a 
public bad in economics is that the effect (cost or benefit) cannot be individualised. As immunisation 
programmes approach herd immunity, everyone benefits; as road traffic increases without 
regulation, all highway users are exposed to increased risk. The choice between the use of public or 
private agents will rest partly on their relative efficiency, partly on their context-specific 
characteristics like human resources practices, partly on the costs and enforceability of contracts 
and governance structures, and partly on general social conventions regarding the accepted roles of 
the private and public sectors.  
 
Conclusions 
It turns out that cost, or opportunity cost, is not quite the simple idea so often claimed for it. Cost 
certainly represents a forgone opportunity but what is forgone may be a physical entity, an aspect of 
human flourishing, or the highest value attached to either. The customary view in economics has 
been that the term  ‘opportunity cost ? relates to the alternative uses of resources. It is not necessarily 
captured in systems of financial accounting, even when expressed as a monetary value. It is 
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sometimes perceived only subjectively in, for example, decisions about the allocation of resources 
within an organisation. It is highly context-dependent. It is always the result of a decision but who 
the decision maker is and what discretion they are allowed are contextual. Likewise, what a decision 
commits the decision maker to may be highly variable and is again context-dependent (like the 
stability and comprehensiveness of a benefits package in a public health care system or National 
Health Service) ?dŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ essential characteristics (dating, duration, rate and volume) are all 
choice variables for the decision maker and those to whom the decision maker is accountable, all of 
whom define the scope of the decision and its other relevant characteristics. 
 
The major take-home lessons are that cost in decisions ought always to be an opportunity cost and 
that cost is always context-dependent or contingent. It is contingent upon the decision to be taken, 
the identity and objectives of the decision maker, the budgetary, technical and political constraints 
imposed upon the decision maker, their permitted discretion within these constraints, their 
accountability to various stakeholders, and the judgments (value and scientific) of the decision 
maker as to the considerations deemed relevant in any particular context. 
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